Abstract. We introduce and formally define polynomial commitment schemes, and provide two efficient constructions. A polynomial commitment scheme allows a committer to commit to a polynomial with a short string that can be used by a verifier to confirm claimed evaluations of the committed polynomial. Although the homomorphic commitment schemes in the literature can be used to achieve this goal, the sizes of their commitments are linear in the degree of the committed polynomial. On the other hand, polynomial commitments in our schemes are of constant size (single elements). The overhead of opening a commitment is also constant; even opening multiple evaluations requires only a constant amount of communication overhead. Therefore, our schemes are useful tools to reduce the communication cost in cryptographic protocols. On that front, we apply our polynomial commitment schemes to four problems in cryptography: verifiable secret sharing, zero-knowledge sets, credentials and content extraction signatures.
Introduction
Commitment schemes are fundamental components of many cryptographic protocols. A commitment scheme allows a committer to publish a value, called the commitment, which binds her to a message (binding) without revealing it (hiding). Later, she may open the commitment and reveal the committed message to a verifier, who can check that the message is consistent with the commitment.
We review three well-known ways a committer can commit to a message. Let g and h be two random generators of a group G of prime order p. The committer can commit to a message m ∈ R Z p simply as C g (m) = g m . This scheme is unconditionally binding, and computationally hiding under the assumption that the discrete logarithm (DL) problem is hard in G. The second scheme, known as a Pedersen commitment [31] , is of the form C g,h (m, r) = g m h r , where r ∈ R Z p . Pedersen commitments are unconditionally hiding, and computationally binding under the DL assumption. Third, the committer may publish H(m) or H(m||r) for any one-way function H. In practice a collision-resistant hash function is often used. A survey by Damgård [16] covers the commitment schemes in detail.
Now consider committing to a polynomial φ(x) ∈ R Z p [x], a problem motivated by verifiable secret sharing. Suppose φ(x) has degree t and coefficients φ 0 , . . . , φ t . We could commit to the string (φ 0 |φ 1 | . . . |φ t ), or to some other unambiguous string representation of φ(x). Based on the commitment function used, this option may have a constant size commitment which uniquely determines φ(x). However, it limits the options for opening the commitment; opening must reveal the entire polynomial. This is not always suitable for cryptographic applications, most notably secret sharing, that require evaluations of the polynomial (i.e., φ(i) for i ∈ Z p ) be revealed to different parties or at different points in the protocol without revealing the entire polynomial. One solution is to commit to the coefficients, e.g., C = (g φ0 , . . . , g φt ), which allows one to easily confirm that an opening φ(i) for index i is consistent with C. However, this has the drawback that the size of the commitment is now t + 1 elements of G.
Our Contributions. The main contribution of this paper is an efficient scheme to commit to polynomials φ(x) ∈ Z p [x] over a bilinear pairing group, called PolyCommit DL , with the following features. The size of the commitment is constant, a single group element. The committer can efficiently open the commitment to any correct evaluation φ(i) along with an element called the witness, which allows a verifier to confirm that φ(i) is indeed the evaluation at i of the polynomial φ(x). The construction is based on an algebraic property of polynomials φ(x) ∈ Z p [x] that (x−i) perfectly divides the polynomial φ(x)−φ(i) for any i ∈ Z p . The hiding property of the scheme is based on the DL assumption. The binding property of the main scheme is proven under the SDH assumption [6] . Using a technique similar to Pedersen commitments, we also define a stronger commitment scheme PolyCommit Ped , which achieves unconditional hiding and computational binding under the SDH assumption.
When a set of evaluations {φ(i) : i ∈ S} is opened at the same time, what we term batch opening, the overhead still remains a single witness element. Security of batch opening assumes that the bilinear version of the SDH (BSDH) problem [21] is hard. Further, our schemes are homomorphic and easily randomizable. As in other work on reducing communication costs (e.g., [8] ) the global system parameters are somewhat large (O(t) in our case). Reducing communication complexity (i.e., the number of bits transferred) is our goal, and to this end we apply the PolyCommit schemes to the following four applications.
First we apply the PolyCommit schemes to the Feldman verifiable secret sharing (VSS) protocol [18] . The new VSS protocol requires a broadcast with size O(1) as compared to O(n) required in the best known protocols in the literature (where n is the number of participants) [18, 31] .
Second, we define and use the PolyCommit schemes to construct a relaxed type of zero-knowledge set (ZKS) [27] . A ZKS is a commitment to a set S, such that the committer may prove that i ∈ S, or i ∈ S without revealing additional information about S, not even |S|. We define nearly zero-knowledge sets as ZKS that do not attempt to hide the size of the committed set. This is sufficient for most applications of zero-knowledge sets, and our construction has constant size proofs of (non)membership as compared to the best known constructions of ZKS that require non-constant communication [12, 25] . We apply the same relaxation to elementary zero-knowledge databases (ZK-EDB), and achieve constant communication there as well.
In the next application we leverage the efficiency of batch opening, by using the PolyCommit schemes in an efficient general construction of a content extraction signature (CES) scheme [35] . A CES scheme allows a signature holder to extract signatures for subsections of the signed message. The general construction, when instantiated with our commitment scheme and a general secure signature scheme, is as efficient as the best known CES scheme, which relies on specific properties of the RSA signature scheme.
In the special case when the CES scheme is used to authenticate a list of attributes, the result is a digital credential with an efficient selective show operation. A selective show allows the credential holder to reveal only a subset of the attributes, with proof that the revealed attributes are signed. More precisely, the communication cost of revealing k attributes in a credential with t attributes is O(k), while known credential systems must communicate O(t) bits. We also show how to efficiently prove knowledge of committed values, allowing predicates on attributes to be proven in zero-knowledge (also with complexity O(k)).
Outline. In the rest of this section, we compare our contributions with related work (work related to each application is included in the respective subsection). In §2, we cover some preliminary material and describe our cryptographic assumptions. §3 defines polynomial commitments and presents our constructions.
§4 is devoted to applications while §5 presents some open problems. Due to space constraints, all security proofs are included in the extended version [24] .
Related Work. Similar to our scheme, a Merkle hash tree [26] allows many values to be committed to with a single element. Here, the leaves of a binary tree are the messages. Each non-leaf node has the value H(L||R) where L and R are its children, and H is a collision-resistant hash function. One can open the commitment to an individual message by revealing the message, and a path up the tree to the root. The opening has size O(log n) as compared to O(1) in our scheme, where n is the total number of (leaf) elements.
Chase et al. [13] introduce mercurial commitments to construct ZKS, which eventually led to the commitment schemes for committing to a vector of messages [12, 25] . Catalano et al. [12] , and Libert and Yung [25] construct vector commitment schemes under the name trapdoor t-mercurial commitments. The security of both of these commitment schemes is based on SDH-like assumptions and their system parameters have size O(t), as in our scheme. In [12] , all messages must be revealed when opening, while in [25] , the committer may open a commitment to a single message. However, in [25] , it is not possible to have arbitrary indices for committed messages since each of the t committed messages is associated with a value in the system parameters g α j for j ∈ [1, t]. Our scheme have no such restriction on the domain for the indices, offering greater flexibility.
Another related primitive is an accumulator [3] , which aggregates a large set of input elements into a single element and can provide a witness as evidence that an element is included in the accumulator. Further, it is possible to use a witness to prove (in zero-knowledge) that the element is included in the accumulator. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [10] extend the concept to dynamic accumulators, which support efficient updates. Au et al. [1] observe that a paring-based accumulator by Nguyen [29] is a bounded accumulator, i.e., only a fixed number of elements can be accumulated. They then go on to use bounded accumulators to construct a compact e-cash scheme [2] . However, the accumulated elements in this scheme are not ordered, which makes it inappropriate for accumulating polynomials. While our PolyCommit schemes provide the same features as nondynamic accumulators, they have additional features (hiding and batch opening) and are more general since we can commit to a polynomial instead of a set.
Preliminaries
In what follows, all adversaries are probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithms with respect to a security parameter κ expect if stated otherwise. Further, they are static and they have to choose their nodes before protocol instances start. A function (·) :
In the rest of the paper, (·) will always denote a negligible function. We use the notation e : G × G → G T to denote a symmetric (type 1) bilinear pairing in groups of prime order p ≥ 2 2κ . The choice of type 1 pairings was made to simplify presentation, however, our constructions can easily be modified to work with pairings of types 2 and 3 as well. For details of bilinear pairings, see the extended version of the paper.
We use the discrete logarithm (DL) assumption [26, Chap. 3] , and the t-strong Diffie-Hellman (t-SDH) assumption [6] to prove the security of the PolyCommit DL and PolyCommit Ped schemes. Security of two additional properties of the schemes require a generalization of the t-Diffie-Hellman inversion (t-DHI) assumption [28, 5] , and the bilinear version of t-SDH, the t-BSDH assumption [21] .
Mitsunari, Sakai and Kasahara [28] introduced the weak Diffie-Hellman assumption, which was renamed the t-DHI assumption by Boneh and Boyen [5] as this assumption is stronger than the Diffie-Hellman assumption, especially for large values of t. See Cheon [14] for a security analysis.
The t-DHI problem is, on input g, g α , . . . , g
equivalently (see [7] ), g α t+1 .
In this paper, we use a generalization of the t-DHI assumption, where A has to output a pair φ(x), g
We call this assumption the t-polynomial Diffie-Hellman (tpolyDH) assumption. This assumption was implicitly made by [1, 2] to support their claim that the accumulator of [29] is bounded. 
Boneh and Boyen [6] defined the t-SDH assumption that is related to but stronger than the t-DHI assumption and has exponentially many non-trivially different solutions, all of which are acceptable.
, for every adversary
Security of the batch opening extension of our commitment schemes requires the bilinear version of the t-SDH assumption, the t-BSDH assumption [21] .
A similar assumption was also made in [22] , but with a different solution: c, e(g, h)
1/(α+c) , where h ∈ R G is an additional system parameter.
Polynomial Commitments
In this section we provide a formal definition of a polynomial commitment scheme, followed by two constructions. In the first construction the commitments are computationally hiding, while in the second they are unconditionally hiding. We also discuss some useful features of our constructions.
Definition
A polynomial commitment scheme consists of six algorithms: Setup, Commit, Open, VerifyPoly, CreateWitness, and VerifyEval. 4 Note that we bound deg(φ) by 2 κ as evaluations can be found for polynomials with higher degrees in PPT using number theoretic techniques (e.g., for φ(
Setup(1 κ , t) generates an appropriate algebraic structure G and a commitment public-private key pair PK, SK to commit to a polynomial of degree ≤ t. For simplicity, we add G to the public key PK. Setup is run by a trusted or distributed authority. Note that SK is not required in the rest of the scheme. Commit(PK, φ(x)) outputs a commitment C to a polynomial φ(x) for the public key PK, and some associated decommitment information d. (In some constructions, d is null.) Open(PK, C, φ(x), d) outputs the polynomial φ(x) used while creating the commitment, with decommitment information d. VerifyPoly(PK, C, φ(x), d) verifies that C is a commitment to φ(x), created with decommitment information d. If so it outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0. CreateWitness(PK, φ(x), i, d) outputs i, φ(i), w i , where w i is a witness for the evaluation φ(i) of φ(x) at the index i and d is the decommitment information. VerifyEval(PK, C, i, φ(i), w i ) verifies that φ(i) is indeed the evaluation at the index i of the polynomial committed in C. If so it outputs 1, otherwise it outputs 0.
Note that it is possible to commit to a list of messages (m 1 , . . . , m t+1 ) by associating each to a unique key (index) k 1 , . . . , k t+1 in Z p , and interpolating to
In terms of security, a malicious committer should not be able to convincingly present two different values as φ(i) with respect to C. Further, until more than deg(φ) points are revealed, the polynomial should remain hidden. Next, we formally define the security and correctness of a polynomial commitment. Correctness. Let PK ← Setup(1 κ ) and C ← Commit(PK, φ(x)). For a commitment C output by Commit(PK, φ(x)), and all
-the output of Open(PK, C, φ(x)) is successfully verified by VerifyPoly(PK, C, φ(x)), and, -any i, φ(i), w i output by CreateWitness(PK, φ(x), i) is successfully verified by VerifyEval(PK, C, i, φ(i), w i ). Polynomial Binding. For all adversaries A:
Evaluation Binding. For all adversaries A:
Hiding. Given PK, C and
-no adversary A can determine φ(î) with non-negligible probability for any unqueried indexî (computational hiding) or -no computationally unbounded adversaryÂ has any information about φ(î) for any unqueried indexî (unconditional hiding).
Construction: PolyCommit DL
We now provide an efficient construction of a polynomial commitment scheme. PolyCommit DL is based on an algebraic property of polynomials
In the literature, Herzberg et al. [23] have used this technique in their share recovery scheme.
Setup(1 κ , t) computes two groups G, and G T of prime order p (providing κ-bit security) such that there exists a symmetric bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T and for which the t-SDH assumption holds. We denote the generated bilinear pairing group as G = e, G, G t . Choose a generator g ∈ R G. Let α ∈ R Z * p be SK, generated by a (possibly distributed) trusted authority. Setup also generates a (t + 1)-tuple g, g α , . . . , g
SK is not required in the rest of the construction.
φj as the commitment to φ(x). Open(PK, C, φ(x)) outputs the committed polynomial φ(x).
φ j x j the algorithm outputs 1, else it outputs 0. Note that this only works when deg(φ) ≤ t.
and outputs i, φ(i), w i , where the witness w i = g ψi(α) is computed in a manner similar to C, above. VerifyEval(PK, C, i, φ(i), w i ) verifies that φ(i) is the evaluation at the index i of the polynomial committed to by C. If e(C, g)
, the algorithm outputs 1, else it outputs 0.
VerifyEval is correct because
PolyCommit DL is a secure polynomial commitment scheme (as defined in Definition 5) provided the DL and t-SDH assumptions hold in G.
A proof is provided in the extended version. The proof of the binding property uses the t-SDH assumption, while the proof of the hiding property uses the DL assumption.
Construction: PolyCommit Ped
PolyCommit Ped is also based on the same algebraic property of φ(x) ∈ Z p [x]: (x − i) perfectly divides the polynomial φ(x) − φ(i) for i ∈ Z p ; however, it uses an additional random polynomialφ(x) to achieve unconditional hiding. The PolyCommit DL scheme is homomorphic in nature. Given PolyCommit DL commitments C φ1 and C φ2 associated with polynomials φ 1 (x) and φ 2 (x) respectively, one can compute the commitment
Setup(1 κ , t) computes two groups G and G T of prime order p (providing κ-bit security) such that there exists a symmetric bilinear pairing e : G × G → G T and for which the t-SDH assumption holds. We denote the generated bilinear pairing group as G = e, G, G t . Choose two generators g, h ∈ R G. Let α ∈ R Z * p be SK, generated by a (possibly distributed) trusted authority. Setup also generates a (2t+2)-tuple g, g α , . . . , g
required by the other algorithms of the commitment scheme.
j=0 (h α j )φ j as the commitment to φ(x). Open(PK, C, φ(x),φ(x)) outputs the committed polynomials φ(x) andφ(x).
j=0φ j x j , it outputs 1, else it outputs 0. This only works when both deg(φ) and deg(φ) ≤ t.
, and outputs i, φ(i),φ(i), w i . Here, the witness w i = g ψi(α) hψ i(α) . VerifyEval(PK, C, i, φ(i),φ(i), w i ) verifies that φ(i) is the evaluation at the index i of the polynomial committed to by C. If e(C, g)
), the algorithm outputs 1, else it outputs 0.
In the extended version we show PolyCommit Ped is correct and prove the following security theorem.
Theorem 2. PolyCommit Ped is a secure polynomial commitment scheme (as defined in Definition 5) provided the t-SDH assumption holds in G.
The proof of the binding property is based on the t-SDH assumption, while the hiding property is unconditional.
Features
We next discuss some important features of PolyCommit DL and PolyCommit Ped .
Homomorphism. In §3.3, we describe that the PolyCommit DL scheme is (additive) homomorphic in nature. In the full version we show that PolyCommit Ped is also homomorphic.
Unconditional Hiding for
Indistinguishability of Commitments. When a polynomial commitment scheme is randomized, an unbounded adversary cannot distinguish commitments to chosen sets of key-value pairs. When committing to a set of key-value pairs ( k 1 , m 1 , . . . , k t+1 , m t+1 ), if indistinguishable PolyCommit DL commitments are required, it is sufficient to set one m i to a random value. On the other hand, the PolyCommit Ped scheme is inherently randomized and can be used directly.
Trapdoor Commitment. The constructions are also trapdoor commitment schemes, where SK = α is the trapdoor. Refer to the extended version for details.
Batch Opening. In the case when multiple evaluations in a PolyCommit DL commitment must be opened, the opening may be batched to reduce the computation and the communication of both the committer and the verifier; i.e., opening multiple evaluations at the same time is cheaper than opening each of those evaluations individually using CreateWitness and VerifyEval. Let B ⊂ Z p , |B| < t be a set of indices to be opened, for a commitment C = g φ(α) created using PolyCommit DL . The witness for the values φ(i), for all i ∈ B, is computed as w B = g ψ B (α) for the polynomial ψ B (x) = φ(x)−r(x) i∈B (x−i) where r(x) is the remainder of the polynomial division φ(x)/( i∈B (x − i)); i.e., φ(x) = ψ B (x) i∈B (x − i) + r(x) and for i ∈ B, φ(i) = r(i). We define two algorithms for batch opening. The algorithm CreateWitnessBatch(PK, φ(x), B) outputs B, r(x), w B and the algorithm VerifyEvalBatch(PK, C, B, r(x), w B ) outputs 1 if e(C, g) ? = e(g i∈B (α−i) , w B )e(g, g r(α) ) holds, deg r(x) = |B|, and r(i) = φ(i) for all i ∈ B.
In terms of security, since commitments are formed in the same way as the Commit algorithm of PolyCommit DL and CreateWitnessBatch reveals no more information than running the CreateWitness algorithm of PolyCommit DL for all batch elements individually, the hiding property (Theorem 1) still holds. For binding, an adversary should not be able to open a batch B containing an index i, in a manner that conflicts with the value φ(i) output in an individual opening of index i. Formally, we say that batch opening is binding if the following holds: This theorem is proven in the full version. The batch construction can be modified for PolyCommit Ped due to homomorphic nature of PolyCommit DL . In the full version we also compare the overhead of various commitment schemes, when Alice commits to t values, and then must reveal k of them. Overhead excludes the communication cost of sending the committed values. Notably, the communication overhead of PolyCommit DL is constant when batch opening is used.
Strong Correctness. VSS schemes will require an additional property of the PolyCommit scheme: it should not be possible to commit to a polynomial of degree greater than t. This is called the strong correctness property.
To define strong correctness for the PolyCommit schemes is not easy, e.g., there are many polynomials φ of degree greater than t such that φ(α) = z ∈ R Z p and so g z is trivially a PolyCommit DL commitment to some polynomial of degree t such that 2 κ > t > t. To avoid this triviality, we require that an adversary A must convince a challenger B that he knows φ with the following game. A creates a commitment to a claimed polynomial φ of degree t . B challenges A with t + 1 indices I ⊂ Z p . A wins if he is able to produce { i, φ(i), w i ) } i∈I accepted by VerifyEval and that the interpolation (in exponents) of any t + 1 witnesses generates a degree t−1 polynomial. Similarly for PolyCommit Ped . Refer to the extended version of the paper for proof of the following theorem. Practicality and Efficiency Improvements. In absence of a single trusted party, computing Setup can be distributed. Here, SK = α is computed in a distributed form (i.e., shared by multiple parties forming a distributed authority) using the concept of distributed key generation [31] . PK is computed using a distributed multiplication protocol [20] . As we do not require SK during our protocols and as anybody can verify the correctness of PK using pairings, it is possible to consider PK as a global reusable set, shared in many systems.
Further, the exponentiations required when committing and creating witnesses can be trivially parallelized. Also, since C = g φ(α) is computed as a product of powers (sometimes called a multi-exponentiation), we suggest using fast exponentiation techniques [32] instead of a naïve implementation. It is also possible to precompute e(C, g) and e(g, g) for use during verification.
Applications
In this section, we describe applications of our commitment schemes to verifiable secret sharing ( §4.1), zero-knowledge sets and elementary databases ( §4.2), and selective disclosure of signed data and credentials ( §4.3).
Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS)
For integers n and t such that n > t ≥ 0, an (n, t)-secret sharing scheme [34, 4] is a method used by a dealer P d to share a secret s among a set of n participants (the sharing Sh phase) in such a way that in the reconstruction Rec phase any subset of t + 1 or more honest participants can compute the secret s, but subsets of size t or fewer cannot. Furthermore, in secret sharing, nodes may need a procedure to verify the correctness of the dealt values in order to prevent malicious behaviour by the dealer. To solve this problem, Chor et al. [15] introduced verifiability in secret sharing, which led to the concept of verifiable secret sharing (VSS).
VSS schemes have two security requirements: secrecy and correctness.
Secrecy (VSS-S).
A t-limited adversary who compromises t nodes cannot compute s during the Sh phase. Correctness (VSS-C). The reconstructed value should be equal to the shared secret s or every honest node concludes that the dealer is malicious by outputting ⊥.
In the computational complexity setting, any malicious behaviour by P d is caught by the honest nodes in the Sh phase itself and the VSS-C property simplifies to the following: the reconstructed value should be equal to the shared secret s. Many VSS applications requires that broadcasts from any t + 1 honest nodes or any 2t+1 nodes is sufficient to reconstruct s. Therefore, along with VSS-S and VSS-C, we mandate the correctness property that we refer as the strong correctness property. Further, some VSS schemes achieve a stronger secrecy guarantee.
Strong Correctness (VSS-SC).
The same unique value s is reconstructed regardless of the subset of nodes (of size greater than 2t) chosen by the adversary in the Rec algorithm. Strong Secrecy (VSS-SS). The adversary who compromises t nodes have no more information about s except what is implied by the public parameters.
Feldman [18] developed the first efficient VSS protocol, which forms the basis of all VSS schemes defined in the literature. In the literature, the discrete logarithm commitment or Pedersen commitment is used in the Feldman VSS achieve the binding (correctness) and the hiding (secrecy) properties. Both of these commitment schemes trivially satisfy the strong correctness (VSS-SC) property of VSS by the fact that the size of a commitment to a polynomial φ(x) ∈ Z p [x] is equal to deg(φ) + 1, which is O(n) (since for optimal resiliency, deg(φ) = t = n−1 2
). However, the commitment to a polynomial has to be broadcast to all nodes, which results in a linear-size broadcast for Feldman VSS and their variants and a linear complexity gap between the message and the bit complexities. Our goal is to close this gap using any of the PolyCommit schemes. Next, we apply PolyCommit DL to existing polynomial-based VSS schemes and reduce the broadcast message size of VSS by a linear factor, making it equal to the message complexity. Although PolyCommit DL can be used in any univariate polynomial-based scheme, we choose the Feldman VSS for ease of exposition.
Sh Phase 1. To share a secret s ∈ Z * p , the dealer P d chooses a random degree t polynomial φ(x) = t j=0 φjx j ∈ Zp[x] such that φ(0) = φ0 = s. It then broadcasts C = Commit(PK, φ(x)).
For
∈ [1, n], P d computes a share s = φ( ), a witness w = CreateWitness(PK, φ(x), ) and sends , φ( ), w to node P over a secure and authenticated channel. 3. After receiving i, φ(i), wi from P d , node Pi runs VerifyEval (PK, C, i, φ(i), wi) .
If the verification fails, Pi broadcasts an accusation message against P d . 4. If more than t nodes accuse P d , then it is clearly faulty and is disqualified. If not, for each accusing party P , P d broadcasts the corresponding share and witness , φ( ), w such that VerifyEval holds. 5. If any of the revealed shares fails VerifyEval, P d is disqualified and the protocol stops. If there is no disqualification, each node P accepts s = φ( ).
Rec Phase Any t + 1 or more nodes Pi publish their accepted shares and witnesses i, si, wi . All t + 1 (or more) nodes verify each of the broadcast shares i, φ(i), wi using VerifyEval and then interpolate the pairs i, φ(i) to determine the secret s = φ(0).
Fig. 1. eVSS: An efficient Feldman VSS using PolyCommit DL
Our efficient Feldman VSS (eVSS) scheme runs Setup(1 κ , t) of PolyCommit DL once, which outputs PK = G, g, g α , . . . , g
Further, as we are working in the synchronous communication model, a resiliency bound of n ≥ 2t + 1 is required for VSS to provide correctness against a t-limited Byzantine adversary as the n − t honest nodes available during the Sh and Rec phases should at least be equal to t+1 (the required threshold). In Figure 1 , we present eVSS that uses the PolyCommit DL scheme in the Feldman VSS. In the Sh and the Rec phases of the eVSS scheme, the VSS methodology remains exactly the same as that of Feldman VSS except here t + 1 commitments of the form g φj for φ(x) = t j=0 φ j x j are replaced by a single polynomial commitment C = g φ(α) . In addition, along with a share s i , P d now sends a witness w i to node P i . Overall, the eVSS protocol needs O(1) broadcast instead of O(n) required by the Feldman VSS. In case of multiple accusations, dealer P d can use the batch opening feature described in §3.4 to provide a single witness for the complete batch. Furthermore, due to the homomorphic nature of PolyCommit, the eVSS scheme can easily converted to a distributed key generation protocol [31] .
Theorem 5. The eVSS protocol implements a synchronous VSS scheme with the VSS-S and VSS-SC properties for n ≥ 2t + 1 provided the DL, t-SDH and t-polyDH assumptions hold in G.
We need to prove the secrecy, correctness and strong correctness properties of a synchronous VSS scheme. Secrecy and correctness result directly from Theorem 1, while Theorem 4 provides the strong correctness property. The secrecy provided by eVSS is computational against a t-bounded adversary, and unconditional against a t − 1 bounded adversary. Share correctness is computational.
PolyCommit DL can easily be replaced by PolyCommit Ped in the above eVSS scheme. In that case, we achieve the strong secrecy (VSS-SS) property due to the unconditional hiding property (Theorem 2) of PolyCommit Ped .
Nearly ZKSs and Nearly ZK-EDBs
Micali et al. [27] define zero-knowledge sets (ZKSs). Basically a ZKS allows a committer to create a short commitment to a set of values S, such that he may later efficiently prove statements of the form k j ∈ S or k j ∈ S in zeroknowledge. No additional information about S is revealed. Perhaps the most challenging aspect in ZKS construction is that not even an upper bound on |S| may be revealed. The closely related notion of zero-knowledge elementary databases (ZK-EDB) is also defined in [27] . Loosely speaking, an EDB is a list of key-value pairs, and a ZK-EDB allows a committer to prove that a given value is associated with a given key with respect to a short commitment.
We argue that relaxing the requirements of a ZKS is sufficient for known applications, and show this leads to a significantly more efficient primitive. In particular, by not hiding |S|, the size of the proof that an element is (or is not) in a committed set is reduced by a factor of sixteen or more, when compared to the best known ZKS construction.
Motivation. Much of the literature on ZKSs does not consider applications [12, 13, 19, 25, 33] . In the applications of ZKSs (and ZK-EDBs) suggested in [27] the size of the set (or DB) is not crucial to the intended security or privacy of the application. The applications given are to improve privacy and access control when the records of an EDB contain sensitive information about people, e.g., medical records. In such cases, revealing a bound on the number of records in the database clearly does not affect the privacy of an individual whose information is kept in the database.
Another use of ZKSs and ZK-EDBs is for committed databases [30] . In this application, a database owner commits to the database and then proves for every query that the response is consistent with the commitment. For many applications the contents of the committed database must be hidden, but the size may be revealed. An example is given in Buldas et al. [9] . Here ZK-EDBs are used to increase the accountability of a certification authority by preventing it from providing inconsistent responses to queries about the validity of a certificate. Clearly, keeping the number of certificates hidden is not required. Therefore, a weaker type of ZKS primitive that does not hide the size of the set will suffice for most practical applications of ZKSs. We call a ZKS that may leak information about the size of the set a nearly ZKS. Similarly, a nearly ZK-EDB is a ZK-EDB that may leak information about the number of records it contains.
Note that an accumulator also represents a set of values with proofs of membership, and some even allow proofs of non-membership (e.g., see [17] ). They do SetupZKS(1 κ , t) outputs PK = Setup(1 κ , t). t is an upper bound on the size of the set which may be committed.
be the random degree t polynomial chosen in PolyCommit Ped . QueryZKS(PK, C, kj) allows the committer to create a proof that either kj ∈ S or kj ∈ S. Compute kj, φ(kj),φ(kj), wj = CreateWitness(PK, φ(x),φ(x), kj).
and a ZK proof of knowledge of φ(kj)
. Let γj = zj, ZK proof . Output πS j = (kj, wj, ⊥, γj). VerifyZKS(PK, C, πS j ) parses πS j as (kj, wj,φ(kj), γj). not however, guarantee hiding (the ZK property), in [17] after seeing responses to t non-membership queries we may recover the entire accumulated set.
Construction of a Nearly ZKS. This construction (Figure 2 ) will use PolyCommit Ped , and allows us to commit to S ⊂ Z p such that |S| ≤ t. The basic idea is to commit to a polynomial φ, such that φ(k j ) = 0 for k j ∈ S, and φ(k j ) = 0 for k j ∈ S. Our construction relies on a ZK proof that proves φ(k j ) = 0 without revealing φ(k j ) to maintain privacy for queries when k j ∈ S. Although a construction based on PolyCommit DL is also possible, we choose PolyCommit Ped as the required ZK proof is simpler in the latter case. For convenience we describe our protocols assuming the ZK proof is non-interactive, however, an interactive ZK proof may be used as well.
A security definition and proof are provided in the full version. The ZK proof of knowledge may be implemented using any secure ZK proof system allowing proof of knowledge of a discrete logarithm (see [11] for examples).
Construction of a Nearly ZK-EDB. This construction (Figure 3 ) makes use of the above nearly ZKS construction and
p be a list of key-value pairs that will define the database (K and V are ordered lists of equal length such that the value m j ∈ V corresponds to the key k j ∈ K). The values may repeat, but the keys must be distinct. We write D(k j ) to denote the value associated to key k j (if k j ∈ K, then D(k j ) = ⊥). The underlying idea of our construction is to commit to the keys using our nearly ZKS, and also commit to φ, such that φ(k j ) = m j , using PolyCommit DL , since it SetupEDB(1 κ , t) runs SetupZKS(1 κ , t), and outputs PK. CommitEDB(PK, D = (K, V )) sets C1 = CommitZKS(PK, K). It then interpolates the t (or fewer) points (kj, mj) ∈ D, and one or more random points (kr, mr) ∈R Zp × Zp to get a polynomial φ2(x) ∈ Zp[x], assured to be of degree t. Set C2 = Commit(PK, φ2(x)) and output E = (C1, C2). QueryEDB(PK, E, kj) parses E as (C1, C2).
(i) If kj ∈ K, compute πS j = QueryZKS(PK, C1, kj) to show that kj ∈ K and kj, mj, wm j = CreateWitness(PK, φ2(x), kj) to show that D(kj) = mj. Output πD j = (πS i , mj, wm j ). (ii) If kj ∈ K, we show that kj ∈ K, set πS j = QueryZKS(PK, C1, kj). Output πD j = (πS j , ⊥, ⊥). VerifyEDB(PK, E, πD j ) parses πD j as (πS j , mj, wm j ) and E as (C1, C2).
(i) If mj = ⊥, then kj ∈ K, output (kj, mj) if VerifyZKS(PK, C1, πS j ) = 1 and VerifyEval(PK, C2, kj, mj, wm j ) = 1. (ii) If mj = ⊥, then kj ∈ K, output 1 if VerifyZKS(PK, C1, πS j ) = 1. Fig. 3 . A nearly ZK-EDB scheme constructed using our nearly ZKS construction (Figure 2) and PolyCommit DL .
is sufficient for security and more efficient. The reason for using the nearly ZKS is to respond to queries when k ∈ D without revealing any additional information.
Efficiency of our nearly ZKS and ZK-EDBs. The size of the commitment is a single group element for a nearly ZKS, or two elements for a nearly ZK-EDB. Proof that k j ∈ S, consists of two group elements, while proof that k j ∈ S consists of about five group elements (when ZK proofs are implemented using a standard three-move ZK protocol, made non-interactive with the Fiat-Shamir heuristic). The proof sizes for our nearly ZK-EDB construction are three and about five group elements (respectively).
The ZK-EDB in the literature with the shortest proofs is that of Libert and Yung [25] (based on their ZKS construction). Asymptotically, (non)membership proofs are O(κ/ log(t)) bits, where κ is a security parameter, and t is the size of the system parameters. For the parameter choices given [25] , proof sizes range from 80-220 group elements. The computation of their scheme and ours is nearly equal. Therefore, using nearly ZK-EDBs in the place of ZK-EDBs reduces communication costs by at least a factor of sixteen.
Credentials and Selective Disclosure of Signed Data
In this section we briefly describe two applications of the PolyCommit schemes, and we will show how polynomial commitments can reduce communication costs. Both applications are based on the following idea. Suppose Alice has a list of values (m 1 , . . . , m t ), which will be signed by Trent. If Trent signs the concatenation, then Alice must reveal all m i to allow Bob to verify the signature. However, if Trent signs C = Commit(PK, φ(x)) where φ(i) = m i , then Alice may allow Bob to verify that Trent has signed m i without revealing the other m j . Bob verifies the signature on C, and Alice produces a witness to prove that C opens to m i at position i, allowing Alice to convince Bob that Trent signed m i . . If (m 1 , . . . , m t ) are parts of a document, then signing a polynomial commitment is a content extraction signature (CES) scheme. Steinfeld et al. [35] introduce CES and give a generic construction of CES signatures. The scheme requires a standard commitment scheme, which is then used to commit to each of the t sub-messages (m 1 , . . . , m t ) individually, forming a vector of commitments, which is signed. The scheme is secure, provided the signature scheme is secure, and the commitment scheme is hiding and binding.
Content Extraction Signatures
Since both PolyCommit schemes are hiding and binding, and allow a list of messages to be committed, they can be used in the general construction of Steinfeld et al. Along with the commitment, Trent should also sign t so that Bob knows that only indices {1, . . . , t} correspond to valid sub-messages. The new scheme is nearly as communication efficient as a specific scheme in [35] which has the lowest communication cost. The latter, however, depends on specific properties of the RSA signature scheme and is secure in the random oracle model. Using a polynomial commitment scheme gives an efficient generic construction. Therefore, efficient standard model CES schemes are possible by combining any of the PolyCommit schemes with a signature scheme secure in the standard model. Pseudonymous Credentials. If (m 1 , . . . , m t ) are attributes about Alice, and Trent is an identity provider, then the signature Alice holds on C is a digital credential that allows Alice to reveal only as much information as is necessary to complete an online transaction. Here, we create C using PolyCommit DL , as batched openings are efficient for PolyCommit DL . Disclosing a single m i requires Alice to transmit (C, Sign Trent (C), i, m i , w i ), the size of which is independent of t. If Alice reveals a subset of the attributes, a single witness may be used to reduce communication even further using batch opening (described in §3.4). Further, if Trent signs multiple commitments to the same attributes (but includes an extra randomized attribute), Alice may present a different commitment to the same verifier unlinkably.
For many interesting applications of credentials, selective show is insufficient because Alice would like to prove something about m i (e.g., m i < 1990) without revealing m i . Alice may prove knowledge of a nonzero committed value φ(i) without revealing it, and compose this proof with other proofs about m i using standard ZK proof techniques for proving knowledge of, relations between or the length of discrete logarithms [11] . Since the communication costs per attribute of proving knowledge of a committed value are constant, if k attributes are involved in showing a credential, the complexity of the show will be O(k). In existing schemes the communication is O(t) where t is the total number of attributes in the credential. Further details of this application are given in the full version of this paper.
